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REGULATION oF BusINBss-RoBINSON-PATMAN Acrr-DEFENSE oF MEETING
CoMPETITon's PruCB-Standard Oil sold gasoline to "jobber" customers at a
price lower than that at which it sold to other customers in the area. The price
differentials were not justified by lower costs. The jobbers made both wholesale
and retail sales of the gasoline; some of them passed on the reduced prices by sales
at less than the prevailing rates in the area. The F.T.C. held1 that Standard's
price differential violated section 2(a) of the Clayton Act, as amended by the
Robinson-Patman Act. 2 Standard contended that the differential was established

A

1 In the Matter of Standard Oil Co., 41 F.T.C. 263 (1945).
2 " ••• it shall be unlawful for any person engaged in commerce,

in the course of such
commerce, either directly or indirectly, ••• to discriminate in price between different purchasers of commodities of like grade and quality ••• where the effect of such discrimination
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in good faith to meet an equally low price of a competitor, and the trial examiner made a finding supporting this contention. The F.T.C. made no finding on
the point, holding that under the act, 8 the defense of meeting a competitor's price
only rebuts the prima facie case that arises from a showing of discrimination, and
that it is immaterial when, as here, there is affirmative proof that the discrimination injured, destroyed, and prevented competition.4 The court of appeals
affirmed.5 On appeal, held, three justices dissenting,6 reversed and remanded for
a finding by the commission whether the price reduction was in good faith to
meet the equally low price of a competitor.7 Such a finding establishes a complete defense under the Robinson-Patman Act. Standard Oil Co. v. Federal
Trade Commission,. (U.S. 1951) 71 S.Ct 240.
Under the original Clayton Act, lowering a price to meet competition was
clearly a substantive defense. 8 The Robinson-Patman Act narrowed the scope of
this defense and placed the provision in a procedural section.9 The principal
case marks the first time that the Court has considered the precise question of
the effect of this change on the nature of the defense.10 The legislative history
may lie substantially ••. to injure, destroy, or prevent competition with any person who
either grants or knowingly receives the benefit of such discrimination, or with customers of
either of them .•••" 49 Stat. L. 1526 (1936), 15 U.S.C. (1946) §l3(a).
3 "Upon proof being made, at any hearing on a complaint under this section, that
there has been discrimination in price or services or facilities furnished, the burden of rebutting the prima-facie case thus made by showing justification shall be upon the person
charged with a violation of this section, and unless justification shall be affirmatively shown,
the Commission is authorized to issue an order terminating the discrimination: Provided,
however, That nothing herein contained shall prevent a seller rebutting the prima-facie case
thus made by showing that his lower price or the furnishing of services or facilities to any
purchaser or purchasers was made in good faith to meet an equally low price of a co~petitor,
or the services or facilities furnished by a competitor." 49 Stat. L. 1526 (1936), 15 U.S.C.
(1946) §l3(b).
4 In the Matter of Standard Oil Co., supra note 1, at 283; see 49 MrcH. L. Rmr. 261
(1950).
5 Standard Oil Co. v. FTC, (7th Cir. 1949) 173 F. (2d) 210.
6 Justice Minton, who wrote the opinion in the court of appeals, took no part in the
consideration of the case before the Supreme Court.
7 The Court indicates that the competitor's price must be "lawful." Principal case at
250. As to what constitutes proof of this defense, see: Com Products Refining Co. v. FTC,
324 U.S. 726, 65 S.Ct. 961 (1945); FTC v. A. E. Staley Manufacturing Co., 324 U.S.
746, 65 S.Ct. 971 (1945); FTC v. Cement Institute, 333 U.S. 683, 68 S.Ct. 793 (1948);
Berger and Goldstein, "Meeting Competition under the Robinson-Patman Act," 44 h.r.. L.
REv. 315 at 327 et seq. (1949).
8 " • • • Provided, That nothing herein contained shall prevent ••• discrimination in
price in the same or different communities made in good faith to meet competition. • • ."
38 Stat. L. 730 (1914), 15 U.S.C. (1934) §13.
9 See note 3 supra.
10 In FTC v. A. E. Staley Manufacturing Co., supra note 7, at 752, the Court said:
''The change in language of this exception was for the purpose of making the defense a
matter of evidence in each case, raising a question of fact as to whether the competition
justified the discrimination." The Court there considered whether the evidence proved the
defense, even though there was a finding of injury to competition. This seems to indicate
that it was considered as absolute defense. See also Com Products Refining Co. v. FTC,
supra note 7; FTC v. Cement Institute, supra note 7. In Moss v. FTC, (2d Cir. 1945) 148
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of this provision is confused, 11 and has been used to support both constructions.12
As a matter of technical construction, either result is possible. In support of the
Court's decision, it is argued that this defense is introduced by the same language
(". • • nothing herein contained shall prevent • • .") as the other defenses in
section 2(a) that are admittedly absolute.13 The use of the term "justification"
may indicate that it is absolute. 14 Also, logically, this may not be a rebuttal of a
prima facie case, as it does not disprove the injury to competition; there may be
injury even when this defense is shown.15 It is argued too that otherwise the
provision has little meaning, since the commission can easily establish a prima
facie case.16 It has been suggested that the other interpretation makes the provision unconstitutional,17 but it is doubtful if this argument has validity today.18
On the other hand, the provision is placed in a procedural section.19 And the
language here is not that "nothing herein contained shall prevent" such practice,
but that "nothing herein contained shall prevent" rebutting a prima facie case
in this manner.20 And it is also said that otherwise the change made by the
Robinson-Patman Act has no meaning. 21 If nothing else, these arguments indicate an ambiguity in the language which should be resolved on the grounds of
F. (2d) 378, cert. den., 326 U.S. 734, 66 S.Ct. 44 (1945), the court of appeals clearly
considered this a complete defense.
Apparently the FTC had previously considered it an absolute defense also. Principal
case at 248. See also Berger and Goldstein, "Meeting Competition under the RobinsonPatman Act," 44 h.r.. L. REv. 315 at 317 (1949); Haslett, "Price Discriminations and
Their Justifications under the Robinson-Patman Act of 1936,'' 46 MxcH. L. REv. 450 at
476 (1948).
11 In explaining this section to the House, Representative Utterback said: "This does
not set up the meeting of competition as an absolute bar to a charge of discriminations
under the bill. It merely permits it to be shown in evidence. This provision is entirely procedural. It does not determine substantive rights, liabilities, and duties." 80 CoNG. REc.
9418 (1936). Cf. ''The proviso permits the seller to meet the price actually previously
offered by a local competitor." H. R. Rep. No. 2287, 74th Cong., 2d sess., p. 16 (1936).
12 Principal case at 248-9, 253-6.
·
13 Principal case at 245.
14 See Berger and Goldstein, "Meeting Competition under the Robinson-Patman Act,"
44 h.r.. L. REv. 315 at 318 (1949); 62 HAnv. L. REv. 1249 (1949).
15 See Haslett, "Price Discriminations and Their Justifications under the Robinson-Patman Act of 1936," 46 MxcH. L. REv. 450 at 477 (1948).
16 See Berger and Goldstein, "Meeting Competition under the Robinson-Patman Act,"
44 h.r.. L. REv. 315 at 320 (1949); 50 HAnv. L. REv. 106 (1936).
17 See Fairmont Creamery Co. v. Minnesota, 274 U.S. 1, 47 S.Ct. 506 (1927);
Wheeler, "Comments on the Robinson-Patman Act," 12 CoNN. B. J. 171 (1938); Haslett, "Price Discriminations and Their Justifications under the Robinson-Patman Act of
1936," 46 MxcH. L. REv. 450 (1948); 23 VA. L. REv. 140 at 166 (1936).
18 See Berger and Goldstein, "Meeting Competition under the Robinson-Patman Act,"
44 h.L. L. REv. 315 at 317 (1949); 62 HAnv. L. REv. 1249 (1949).
19 See 49 CoL. L. REv. 863 (1949). However, it has been suggested that the defense
was taken from section 2(a) and placed in section 2(b) since this provision, as amended,
refers not only to violations of section 2(a), but also of section 2(e). Berger and Goldstein,
"Meeting Competition under the Robinson-Patman Act," 44 h.r.. L. REv. 315 at 320
(1949). See principal case at 245.
20 Principal case at 257.
21 Principal case at 251.
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policy.22 The dissent in the Supreme Court indicates a desire for a policy of
strict enforcement of uniformity in prices by narrowing the exceptions that allow
differentials.23 On the other hand, the majority argues that the purpose of the
anti-trust policy of the government, as shown by the Sherman and Clayton Acts,
is to protect competition, whereas taking away this defense prevents competition
in certain situations24 and may cause hardship to the seller, as he must either
cut his prices to all customers or lose this particular customer and perhaps have
to raise other prices to compensate for the loss; either alternative may be ruinous
to his business.25 Thus there are valid economic and policy arguments for the
decision of the Court. The construction given the provision by the majority then
reaches a desirable result without doing violence to the ambiguous language of
the Robinson-Patman Act. Any inconsistency with the policy of that act is
slight, since this defense is still narrow in scope, as it can be used only as a
defense and not as an offensive weapon in price wars.26

Willis B. Snell, S. Ed.

2 2 The dissenting justices admit that there are arguments to support the majority's conclusion. Principal case at 258.
23 Principal case at 256 et seq.
24 Principal case at 249-50.
25 Principal case at 250.
26 Principal case at 249. See Berger and Goldstein, "Meeting Competition under the
Robinson-Patman Act," 44 ILL. L. REv. 315 (1949).

